After Iran
A funny thing happened on the way to the Apocalypse.
Back on March 13, less than a week after Trump and Netanyahu started (actually, resumed) bombing Iran, I wrote a piece on Trump's war launch (Days of Infamy), and on April 3-5 I followed that up with two more pieces: one on how it started (The Three Questions), and one on how it might end (The Big Question). I didn't try to answer the latter directly, but as many different outcomes were possible, I tried to parameterize the problem by raising another 16 questions. I also wrote a bit about the novel — at least unanticipated by me — prospect of Iran reopening the Strait of Hormuz but collecting tolls for passage. I recognized several advantages in this: especially that takes a conflict which has ostensibly been driven by ideology and turns it into a question of costs and benefits. That could greatly simplifies the problem of compromise, making it a matter of cool calculation rather as opposed to the nasty overtones of dominance and submission.
I expected to follow this piece up with one where I weighed out the answers to the sixteen questions, and thereby narrowed down the possible outcomes. I never wrote that piece, because Trump’s mood swings were too erratic and incoherent to clarify either a plan or a set of criteria for evaluating a plan. What was quickly clear was that Iran had survived and was able to continue a fairly long war of attrition, including the ability to inflict significant harm on the Gulf states, and through them to the world economy. It was also clear that Netanyahu would not of his own free will agree to any peace deal. (He could be voted out in October, but that’s a long ways away, and his prospects would be better if he could keep fighting.)
That left Trump as the main variable. The answer to question 7 (”how long can Trump sustain this war politically?”) isn’t clear. He’s shown himself to be pretty oblivious to his very low polls, and doesn’t seem particularly worried about losing Congress in November. He has 30 months left in his term, and seems to have absolute faith that he will win out in the end. On the other hand, while America isn’t much of a democracy, there are other people who have influence over Trump, which makes it difficult even for such an autocratic president to stick to such a disastrous course.
The other key question is number 9: “what is the minimum outcome that Iran can agree to that will allow Trump to save face?” That’s been very speculative until this week, when Trump signed this 14-point Memorandum of Understanding with Iran (and, notably, without Israel or Hezbollah, although a ceasefire and withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon are very much part of the understanding). The first thing that should be said here is that this outline is very clear, with little room for misunderstanding or future sabotage and recriminations — unlike Trump’s 20-point Gaza plan, which was mostly a matter of Trump negotiating with his own financial advisers. The second thing is that this is potentially a very good deal for everyone. It may not be treated that way, especially by those who had such high hopes for the war as a triumph of Israeli-American brute power, but that’s mostly sour grapes. If we learn anything from this war, it’s that power destroys, and makes losers of us all. The whole paradigm of “defense through strength” and corollaries like the notion of deterrence have been massively disproven by events.
In a nutshell, the future agreement that the Memorandum of Understanding points to is just a few simple points:
Trump will eventually be able to claim his victory in denying Iran the development of nuclear weapons, but only after the rest of the agreement is finalized. (Until then, Iran pledges not to develop nuclear weapons, as they have done all along.)
The Strait of Hormuz will also be opened to shipping, probably without any fees to Iran. (Iran could, of course, close the Strait and exact fees, should other means of financing their reconstruction be impeded.) This, too, is a clear Trump victory point.
Iran will be free from all US and other sanctions. This is the end of the economic war the US has been waging against Iran ever since the fall of the Shah in 1979. Aside from some excessive revolutionary zeal in the early days, when Iranians remembered all too well how the US embassy had been responsible for overthrowing their government and installing the much hated Shah, this economic warfare has been the force that has provoked nearly all of Iran’s subsequent hostility to the US and Israel. Take that away, and peace is possible. Don’t take it away (which was Obama’s tactic in negotiating the JCPOA), and hostilities inevitably resurface.
Israel has to end its bombardment and occupation of Lebanon. In return, Iran will stop providing military support for Hezbollah, which if safe from Israel will no longer have need of a militia.
Iran will be able to receive reconstruction funds in some form, without Trump admitting to reparations, and without Strait fees. Some of this will come from sanctions relief, and some will come from direct foreign investment, mostly from the Gulf States.
The only hard call for Trump is that he press Netanyahu to withdraw from Lebanon. Trump isn’t practiced at standing up to Netanyahu. They have many of the same donors, and he’s surrounded himself with people who would do anything for Israel. They also share the same instinct for getting their way through bullying. On the other hand, financial considerations rule Trump, and both the profit and loss ledgers favor the deal with Iran. So does the political considerations. Trump may not survive having started the war, but he certainly won’t last long for failing to end it.
On the other hand, I’ve long thought that the only reason Israel was so set on demonizing Iran was that they thought it was a good way to keep the Americans in line, doling out billions every year, doing their diplomatic bit, while effectively ignoring the Palestinians. While America was fairly magnanimous toward the world, including its defeated enemies, after WWII, the long history of fiascos ever since have been met by little more than sore loser grudges (starting in Korea, where after 73 years we are still technically at war). Iran was just another grudge, but one that Israel could pick at whenever they wanted. But will it continue to work? Not if Trump genuinely wants peace with Iran. Netanyahu surely understands that Israel cannot sustain its war against Iran without American support, and that even if they could (which presumably they could in Lebanon, at least for a few more months), would they risk breaking with Trump to do so?
I doubt it. That’s partly because I don’t think Israel really cares about Iran. I doubt they even care about Lebanon. Sure, the idea of annexing southern Lebanon goes back to Ben-Gurion, but he never seriously pursued it, nor did Israel build settlements when they occupied Lebanon from 1982-2000. The far right is pushing the idea now because no one has tried to stop them, but if Trump leans on Netanyahu, the idea will surely be put back on the shelf. What does matter to Netanyahu and his allies, and for that matter to many of his enemies, is the Palestinians.
It is noteworthy that the Memorandum of Understanding makes no mention of the Palestinians. While it insists that Israel withdraw from Lebanon and refrain from threatening much less attacking Iran and Lebanon, it places no restrictions on what Israel can do within its own borders, to its own people. Perhaps Iran is being pragmatic here, realizing that any demand on Israel’s internal affairs would be a step too far. (After all, they do insist on the US and Israel not interfering in their own internal affairs.) Or perhaps it just shows that the notion that Iran was hellbent on attacking Jews was never true. Or quite possibly both.
This gives Netanyahu leverage to get concessions from Trump, for an even freer hand in dealing with the Palestinians. He might, for instance, get Trump to revive his idea of driving the Palestinians out of Israeli territory. On the other hand, the risks of fighting Trump may be severe. Israel still depends on the US for arms and money, and for diplomatic cover, useful in fighting against BDS campaigns and ICC indictments. And much of Netanyahu’s political capital is based on the idea that he’s a master at manipulating the Americans. He will certainly whine and pout over having to leave Lebanon, but he would be stupid not to take this off ramp.
Whether Netanyahu can spin this war ending into some kind of victory narrative remains to be seen. Like Trump, he is facing an uphill battle, as memory of the wars and anguish he has caused, along with his own legacy of corruption and dishonesty, will vie with whatever new story he tries to tell, and how it compares with the fantasies he was hawking at the start. In Netanyahu’s favor, the war narrative has always been popular in Israel (at least among the only voters who count). Trump’s war has never been remotely close to popular. His only plus is that the media that excoriated Biden for losing Afghanistan is mostly in his pocket (see his press release (mostly quotes from loyal Republicans, like “The Iran deal is straightforward, common sense leadership from @POTUS,” and “President Trump secured a historic agreement with Iran, bringing an end to the conflict and demonstrating once again that peace is achieved through strength”).
By the way, I suspect that the real heroes of this deal are the Gulf State Arabs. They ran the biggest risk of an extended war, especially as they are rich in targets Iran could easily demolish. That Iran was reluctant to do so is fairly clear. On the other hand, they never broke publicly with the US, which allowed them to exercise back-channel influence. In the end, the money that greased the wheels of diplomacy will mostly come from them. But they’re used to throwing money at problems, and may now, with once the sanctions vanish, may find some opportunities in Iran.
While it’s possible that the Palestinians will be the big losers in this deal — Netanyahu still has Hamas to extirpate, and the settlers will continue to terrorize the West Bank with impunity — it’s also true that most genocides have taken place under the fog of war, and that the Iran war has mostly served as cover for Israel’s crimes at home and in Lebanon (while keeping the Americans distracted). And it’s just possible that peace will prove contagious. Since October 2023, Israel has exposed itself as an extremely racist and violent nation, and nothing short of genuine contrition (hah!) is going to erase that. Moreover, with the end of the Iran bogey, their claimed right to “self defense” rings ever more hollow. There is little doubt in my mind that Israel could, if only they wanted to, come up with a decent and respectful modus vivendi with the Palestinians. They’ve never had to, and never wanted to do, but at some point nearly everyone wants to settle into a normal (safe and secure and free) life, and to do that you need to allow others the same.
Of course, there is much that could wrong with this deal. I’m generally inclined to assume that all people on all sides will act rationally, but that clearly isn’t the case, as some of them started this war in the first place. Trump is easily the most delusional, and the most fickle and unsteady, of the bunch, but all sides have their mountebanks, eager to claim victory where none is possible, or to castigate others for facing reality while they still insist on imagining something better.
Iran and the Gulf States have an advantage here, in that their inner sanctums of power are more restricted, and their media is more constrained, so they’re less likely to expose in-fighting. Israel is somewhat more open, especially to the right, and their coalition system makes Netanyahu more vulnerable than Trump is (although with elections already scheduled, it’s not clear to me what more damage Smotrich and Ben-Gvir can do in breaking with Netanyahu). The US is much more open, but Trump’s power base is protected, and few in the right-wing media ecosystem are likely to cross him. Obviously, one source of discontent at the moment are those in the media who are more loyal to Netanyahu than to Trump. Another source of criticism, if not necessarily opposition, is from Democrats: some of whom are diehard Israel supporters, and some who simply want to score points by comparing the Trump and Obama deals, or to contrast the deal unfavorably with either the pre-war reality or with Trump’s stated ambitions.
It is easy to lapse into calling Trump weak and goading him into restarting the war, which is a real danger for someone as fickle and temperamental (and, sure, stupid) as he is. Trita Parsi has written a good piece on how “comparing [Trump’s] Iran deal with Obama’s or decrying the terms risks falling into the same traps as previous presidents”: Trump ended his idiotic Iran war. Good. The one point I want to add is that on paper and in potential, Trump’s “deal” is much better for all concerned than Obama’s was. That’s because Obama’s deal was all about tying Iran up, while leaving the US (and Israel) unfettered — a “solution” that could only lead to further hostility, especially when the US piled new sanctions in place of the old — whereas the Trump deal lays the foundation for lasting peace. The big question is whether peace is what Trump actually wants — it clearly isn’t what Netanyahu wants. And the test of this is quite simple and clear: whether Trump can and will pressure Netanyahu to withdraw from Lebanon.
If he does that, showing steadfast conviction for once, even I won’t quarrel with calling him the toughest US president since Eisenhower — a relevant reference point given how he backed Ben-Gurion out of Sinai in 1956. I won’t vote for him, because he’s still a fascist, but I won’t mind giving him some credit for one key thing the Blob has failed to do over fifty years. Not one I wished for, but Trump’s wake of wreckage is turning into some kind of revolutionary experience.